Does the Rarity of Miracles Rule Out Their Possibility?

Caleb Colley, Ph.D.

Deity of ChristMiracles

Christianity is based on the historicity of the miracles recorded in the Bible, especially the resurrection of Jesus (see 1 Corinthians 15). Critics of the Bible often express concern about the miraculous aspects of Christianity. They typically deny either the historicity of biblical miracles or even the possibility of biblical miracles. In order to respond effectively to such criticisms, the apologist must understand the critic’s argument and show one or more of the premises to be untrue or its reasoning to be unsound. One of the arguments against biblical miracles that has been influential is that of the 18th-century Scottish philosopher David Hume.1 Norman Geisler has summarized Hume’s argument as follows:2

• Premise One: Natural law is by definition a description of a regular occurrence.
• Premise Two: A miracle is by definition a rare occurrence.
• Premise Three: The evidence for the regular is always greater than that for the rare.
• Premise Four: A wise man always bases his belief on the greater evidence.
• Conclusion: Therefore, a wise man does not believe in miracles.

In this case, the conclusion is false because the third premise is false. Miracles are indeed rare, but rare events do happen. In fact, many one-time events have been confirmed historically.3 So, it is not the case that the evidence for the regular is always greater than the evidence for the rare. Consider some examples:

• If God created the Universe (and Apologetics Press has presented powerful evidence that He did), the Creation was a one-time event that is nevertheless supported by strong evidence.
• The attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 was a one-time event, and yet the evidence for its historicity is overwhelming.
• People whose exploits are highly unique really lived. For example, Richard Whately cleverly used Hume’s argument satirically to “prove” that Napoleon Bonaparte never existed.4 (If Hume’s argument can be correctly applied and lead to the conclusion that a known historical person never existed, then something is wrong with Hume’s argument.)

Suppose we modified the third premise of Hume’s argument to say, “Alleged miracles are always supported by less evidence than the evidence for natural explanations.” Would this modified premise fare any better? No, because it fails to take into account just how much evidence we could have for a miracle. When we weigh the evidence for Jesus’ resurrection, we must consider not just the infrequency of miracles, but also the specific evidence for the resurrection (our three historical facts), and the background information (such as the existence of God and the undeniably unique, powerful ministry of Jesus). The specific evidence and background information can dramatically increase the probability that a miracle has indeed occurred.5

The probability that a miracle occurred is established by answering one question: What is the probability that we would have our same historical facts had the miracle not occurred? For example, consider the three basic, historical facts surrounding the resurrection of Jesus. It is accepted by the majority of New Testament scholars (even those who deny the resurrection) today (1) that Jesus’ tomb was found empty; (2) that many individuals and groups had experiences of the risen Lord; and (3) that the disciples suddenly came to believe sincerely in the resurrection despite having every predisposition to the contrary.6 What is the probability that these facts would obtain, but that the resurrection did not occur? The answer to this question makes the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth not just a possibility but a historical certainty. The hypothesis that God raised Jesus from the dead requires us to add only one additional belief—that God exists. This additional belief is justified because there are many independent arguments and evidences to show that God exists (e.g., the cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments for God’s existence). In order to make it reasonable to believe that our three historical events occurred without the resurrection, skeptics would need to come up with some alternate, plausible, non-miraculous explanations for the three facts. This they have been unable to do.7

Conclusion

Our confidence in the resurrection of Jesus is based, not only on the historical data, but also on the testimony of the supernaturally inspired and confirmed Scriptures (Romans 10:17; 2 Corinthians 5:7; Hebrews 2:3-4). Nonetheless, in dealing with skeptics who doubt the inspiration of the Bible, it is helpful to show that biblical miracles are not at all unlikely when viewed in the light of accepted historical facts.

Endnotes

1 David Hume (1993), An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Indianapolis: Hackett), 2nd edition, section 10.

2 Norman Geisler (1999), Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker), p. 458.

3 See Kyle Butt (2009), “The ‘Problem’ with Miracles,” Apologetics Press, apologeticspress.org/the-problem-with-miracles-897/.

4 Richard Whately (1880), “Historical Doubts Concerning the Existence of Napoleon Bonaparte,” ed. Henry Morely, Famous Pamphlets (London: George Routledge and Sons), 2nd edition, p. 290.

5 See John Earman (2000), Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument Against Miracles (Oxford: Oxford University).

6 Gary R. Habermas (2003), The Risen Jesus and Future Hope (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield); Habermas, “Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present: What are Critical Scholars Saying?,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus,” 3[2]:135-53; see also Habermas’ extended version of the article here on his website (2005): https://www.garyhabermas.com/articles/J_Study_Historical_Jesus_3-2_2005/J_Study_Historical_Jesus_3-2_2005.htm#ch3; William Lane Craig (2008), Reasonable Faith (Wheaton: Crossway), 3rd edition, pp. 361-371.

7 See Kyle Butt (2002), “The Resurrection of Jesus Christ,” Apologetics Press, apologeticspress.org/the-resurrection-of-jesus-christ-147/

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